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CONVICTION OF THOSE INVOLVED IN "SIT-IN"
DEMONSTRATION REVERSED
Garner v. Louisiana
368 U.S. 157 (1961)
On March 29, 1960, Negro students at Southern University attempted
sit-in demonstrations at lunch counters in a drug store, a department store,
and a bus terminal in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The students were arrested
and charged with violation of the Louisiana breach of peace statute.' Their
refusal to move from their seats, after being requested to do so, was held to
be "conduct in such manner as to unreasonably and foreseeably disturb the
peace." 2 The Supreme Court of Louisiana upheld the convictions, but
certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court3 and the judg-
ment was reversed. 4
The majority of the court, finding it unnecessary to decide whether
such "sit-ins" were a protected right or a form of criminal activity, reversed
on the ground that the record was so totally devoid of evidence that the
convictions lacked due process.'
This finding by the Court is arguable0 and even assuming that its basis
is correct, the decision does not appear to affect anyone but the petitioners.
It seems plain that a conviction, in order to comply with the requirements
of due process, should be supported by at least some evidence of guilt. The
fact that the Court made the same ruling the year before in Thompson v.
City of Louisville1 makes the majority's holding a disappointment to those
who may have anticipated a significant ruling on the sit-in demonstrations. 8
1 La. Rev. Stat. § 14:103(7) (1950).
2 Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 158 (1961) (Louisiana Supreme Court decision
not officially reported).
3 Garner v. Louisiana, 365 U.S. 840 (1960).
4 Garner v. Louisiana, supra note 2.
5 Id. at 163.
6 The majority interpreted the Louisiana statute as requiring outwardly boisterous
or unruly conduct (368 U.S. at 169) and held that the trial judge could not take judicial
notice of strained relations between the races in the locality without informing the
defendants (368 U.S. at 173). See concurring opinions by Mr. justice Douglas, 368
U.S. at 176-7, and Mr. Justice Harlan, 368 U.S. at 193.
7 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
8 Mr. justice Harlan in a concurring opinion would protect the petitioners' con-
duct on the ground that it is an exercise of free speech. The demonstrations can be
looked at as a means of bringing to the public attention the plight of the Negro in
the South. Viewed in this way, the sit-ins appear very similar to picketing by labor
organizations, which was held to fall within the constitutional protection in Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1939). There is, however, one important difference. Picketing
takes place on public sidewalks while the sit-ins occur on private property. Mr. Justice
Harlan overcomes this distinction by finding implied permission by the management
(of doubtful validity in the case of Defendant Briscoe) (368 U.S. 197-8). Recognition
of the sit-ins as an exercise of free speech is not the complete answer. In the opinion
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The case is exceptional, however, for the views advanced by Mr. Justice
Douglas in his concurring opinion.
Mr. Justice Douglas found that segregated lunch counters in this case
were forbidden by the fourteenth amendment.9 He established the tie-in
between the conduct of the store owners and the state, necessary to lift such
activity from the area of private wrongdoing, in two ways: by custom and
by state regulatory power. To show that segregation is basic to the Louisiana
way of life, he cited an impressive list of statutes 0 requiring segregation in
a variety of activities and places (although none of these required segrega-
tion in facilities involved in the Garner cases). There does seem little doubt
that the action of the owners in the Garner case was approved by the com-
munity. There is a great deal of doubt, however, as to whether this alone
should be enough to bring their conduct within the reach of the fourteenth
amendment.
The notion that a state custom supporting racial segregation by indi-
viduals is prohibited by the fourteenth amendment was negatively implied
by Mr. Justice Bradley in the Civil Rights Cases" in 1883. However, the
Supreme Court in later cases dealing with discrimination does not appear
to have taken advantage of this opening. If it had, the holding in that case-
that Congress could adopt only such general legislation as may be necessary
to counteract state action-would have been more than ample to reach most
"private" discrimination in the Deep South. In those states with a tradition
of segregation, it can be assumed that discriminatory actions by individuals
take place with the approval of the community.' 2
of the present majority of the Supreme Court, the right of free speech in the area of
socio-economic discussion must be balanced against the interest of the state in providing
for the general welfare of its inhabitants. Also, sit-ins involve more than merely the
dissemination of ideas. If the Negroes' occupation of seats prevents white customers
from being served, the demonstrators have gone beyond calling attention to their
situation and are applying direct economic coercion by depriving the owners of revenue.
The constitutional protection would not extend to such conduct. See United Electrical
Workers v. Baldwin, 67 F. Supp. 235 (D. Conn. 1946), where pickets formed a solid
line interfering with free access to the picketed plant.
9 Garner v. Louisiana, supra note 2, at 181 (concurring opinion).
10 Garner v. Louisiana, supra note 2, at 179-81 (concurring opinion). See, e.g.,
La. Rev. Stat. § 4:5 (activities involving social contacts), § 15:752 (persons), and
§ 33:4558 (in public facilities).
11 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
12 In the only case which Mr. Justice Douglas cites to support his contention,
Baldwin v. Morgan, 287 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1960), the court did find that there was a
"custom, practice and usage" of the city denying protection of the law, but it was not
necessary for the decision. The court had no trouble finding discriminatory state
action. A state statute provided that every railroad company in the state was to
provide and maintain waiting rooms having regard to race and sex, to be determined
by the state public service commission, and the commission promulgated an order re-
quiring that all common carriers by rail were to provide separate waiting rooms for
white and Negro at each passenger depot.
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The Baton Rouge City Code, as do most municipal codes, requires a
permit in order to operate a restaurant. 13 To Mr. Justice Douglas, restaurants
are therefore "property affected with a public interest" and the licensee is an
agent of the government. From this he concludes that the restaurateur is
subject to the same constitutional restriction as is the state government
itself.' 4 If the licensee of the government operates under a "privilege,"'u
this notion has much persuasive force. The authority of the government is
derived from the people and a policy of discrimination against a large class
of those people seems at best sheer ingratitude. However, a license is not a
privilege in the sense that it may be granted or withheld at the whim of the
regulating body. While every business or occupation is subject to regulation
by the state in the public interest, 16 if a statute or an administrative agency
allows some citizens to engage in what is presumptively a legitimate business
while denying such right to others, the basis for distinction must have some
rational relation to the police power.1
As a practical matter, the use of state regulatory power as a criterion
cannot stand when carried to its logical extreme. Doctors,'8 lawyers,' 9 and
those in most other professions2 ° must receive the permission of the state to
practice within its borders. Cities also have authority to require licenses for
any number of things within their jurisdiction, e.g., taverns,2 ' billiard rooms
and livery stables.22 To hold these persons as agents of the state and these
businesses as "property affected with the public interest" seems rather
extreme. The issue of whether discrimination by a licensee of the state is
forbidden state action has been before the federal courts in the past and
has been rejected on the ground that the requirement is merely to insure
minimum health standards in restaurants for the protection of the community
and is not an attempt to control the management of the business or to
dictate who is to be served.2 3 The state in granting the license would at
most be permitting discrimination by the licensee and would not, as Mr.
Justice Douglas suggests, be enforcing a policy of segregation. 24
13 Garner v. Louisiana, supra note 2, at 183 (concurring opinion).
14 Ibid.
15 Mr. Justice Douglas appears to base his argument on this assumption. See
Garner v. Louisiana, supra note 2, at 184-5 (concurring opinion).
11 11 Am. Jur. Constitutional Law § 337 (1937).
17 11 Am. Jur. Constitutional Law § 285 (1937); 33 Am. Jur. Licenses § 17 (1941).
18 Ohio Rev. Code § 4731.14 (1953).
19 Ohio Rev. Code § 4705.01 (1953).
20 Ohio Rev. Code Title 47 (1953).
21 Ohio Rev. Code § 715.63 (1953).
22 Ohio Rev. Code § 715.61 (1953).
23 Williams v. Howard Johnson Restaurant, 268 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1958); Slack
v. Atlantic White Tower System, 181 F. Supp. 124 (D. Md. 1960); Watkins v. Oak-
lawn Jockey Club, 86 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D. Ark. 1949).
24 The license cases cited by Mr. Justice Douglas are easily distinguished from the
restaurant cases. They involve either an exclusive franchise such as a city transit
service (Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903, 1956; Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co.,
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Garner might have been decided differently had the case arisen under
the new Louisiana statute prohibiting a person from going on any structure
belonging to another after having been forbidden to do so by any authorized
person.m The Civil Rights Cases26 leave no doubt that the fourteenth amend-
ment does not give the federal government the power to prohibit individuals
from discriminating because of race.27 If the Negro is to be protected
against such private conduct, he must ordinarily look to the state. As a result
of the decision in the Civil Rights Cases, the Court places much emphasis
on the ability, or inability, to find the necessary connection between the
defendant and the state. However, it appears that the search for state
action takes place, not as a required step in reaching the decision, but as
a rationalization after the Court has determined how it will rule.28 The
critical issue should not be categorizing the activity of the defendant as
private or state action, but rather determining whether the state denies the
Negro the equal protection of the laws by permitting private discrimination
on the basis of race without liability.29 In the discrimination area, when
the state defines and enforces the legal relations between individuals, there
are many competing interests which should be considered. In determining
which interests should prevail, the state is not permitted to be influenced
by the race of the parties. A local policy decision that a particular interest
is not important enough to be protected is proper, but the same determina-
tion would be improper if it is a disguised attempt to deny the remedy to a
particular class.30
280 F.2d 531, 5th Cir., 1960) or publicly owned facilities such as a municipal golf
course or a public beach (Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877,
1955; Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879, 1955).
25 La. Rev. Stat. § 14:103.1 (1960 Supp.).
26 Civil Rights Cases, supra note 11.
"27 But see tenBroek, The Antislavery Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment (1951)
and Harris, The Quest for Equality (1960). There is much evidence that the fourteenth
amendment, when passed, was meant -to be much broader than the construction it
was later given in the courts. The aim of the amendment was to remove all con-
stitutional doubts from the civil rights bills. These bills asserted a broad power on the
part of the federal government to protect specified rights not only against unjust legis-
lation but also against prevailing public sentiment and custom.
The arguments of those who opposed the amendment were based on the ground
that it would destroy the federal system and create a consolidated national government.
This tends to show the courts gave much less power to the federal government than
was originally granted.
28 As a result, the language of the Court may be misleading in attempting to
predict the results of future cases. In the Garner case, the store owner's conduct was
supported by the police, who forced the demonstrators to leave, and by the court,
which determined that the petitioners were guilty of criminal conduct in remaining
seated at a segregated counter. This would be enough to find state action according to
the opinion in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
2 Horowitz, "The Misleading Search for 'State Action'," 30 So. Cal. L. Rev. 208,
211 (1957).
30 For example, a policy decision that neither whites nor Negroes deserved redress
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The fact that the sit-ins occur in the Deep South rather than in some
other area would influence the Supreme Court's decision. Segregated facilities
are a part of the "accepted" way of life in many Southern communities.
Besides the difference this would make in the impact on the interest of the
Negro,31 it is also important in its effect on the notion of federalism. The
phrasing of the fourteenth amendment prohibits state, as opposed to indi-
vidual, discrimination. Thus the congressmen who passed this amendment
expressly recognized the value in decentralizing some administrative and
policy-making functions. Placing responsibility and control in the smallest
possible unit has many advantages. 32 However, the doctrine should not be
applied so as to insulate local irresponsibility or to give incentive to further
private discrimination. If the sit-ins arise in an area where local authorities
have demonstrated an earnest attempt to resolve the problem of race rela-
tions, the federal government should more readily leave the Negroes to their
local remedies. 33
In deciding each case the court should attempt to weigh the harm caused
the Negro if he would not be allowed to do what he wished against the
benefit which the other party would obtain by discrimination. If both .the
restaurant owner and the Negro customer desired to do business, the court
should not enjoin such a transaction because another customer at the same
counter did not wish to eat with persons of a different race. The right to enter
into a contract would far outweigh the disaffected third party's right to
choose who shall not be his dinner companions in a public establishment.
The same result would probably be reached if a former owner tried to
prevent the new owner from serving Negroes because of a covenant to that
effect in the deed.3 4 A home owner may refuse to permit anyone from entering
his house and his reasons for granting or denying access may be due to
prejudice or mere whim. His interest in privacy and freedom of association
are sufficiently important that he will not be held to any reasonable stand-
ard.33; The segregated lunch counter falls somewhere between these extremes
along with countless other possible fact situations. Denial of service at a
particular lunch counter could have diverse impacts. The harm could be
on being excluded from a neighborhood because of race would in its practical effect
deny the remedy only to the Negro. A white person who was prevented from purchas-
ing a house in an all-Negro neighborhood would have little trouble finding comparable
facilities elsewhere. The same is not generally true of the Negro who is refused housing
in an all-white neighborhood. See Van Alstyne and Karst, "State Action," 14 Stan.
L. Rev. 3, 14-16 (1961).
31 The impact on the interest of the Negro would be much more serious if
segregated restaurants were the rule rather than the exception in the community.
32 For example: Federal legislation is ordinarily aimed at the whole country; it
would be awkward in correcting isolated local evils; those in the community tend to
have more knowledge of local controversies; it allows the local community to retain
more "ballot box" control over those formulating the policy which will affect it.
33 Van Alstyne and Karst, supra note 29, at 17.
34 Shelley v. Kraemer, supra note 27.
35 Van Astyne and Karst, supra note 29, at 7.
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negligible or rather serious, depending on the circumstances. If there is a
separate counter in the building which caters to Negroes, the interest in
being able to obtain sustenance is virtually unaffected. Even if the restaurant
refused to serve Negroes on any basis, the harm caused the Negro would not
be great if there were other restaurants in the same vicinity that did not
discriminate. If there is no other restaurant in the vicinity that would serve
Negroes, the effect would be more serious. The inability to obtain a meal
could be detrimental to health.
The importance of protecting the interest of the Negro in being served
might depend upon the reason the person desired service at this establish-
ment. If he were required to be in the area for a prolonged period, e.g., be-
cause of his job or his school, his interest would outweigh that of a shopper
who would not have to make the trip at meal time. By the same reasoning,
the interest of a shopper in obtaining refreshment is far more important
than that of a person who came for the sole purpose of demonstrating.
Even in the case where the Negro can be served at a separate counter, he
may still be prevented from sitting with whom he pleases. To separate him
from others wholly because of his race could cause feelings of inferiority.
Here the impact might vary with the age of the victim. A person in his
formative years would be more strongly affected than an adult.3 6
The court should weigh the effect on the store owner of a holding that
he must not distinguish between customers on the basis of color against the
harm which would be caused the Negro if discrimination were found privi-
leged. The owner of a restaurant, if he comes in contact with the customers,
e.g., by waiting tables or operating the cash register, also has an interest in
choosing with whom he wishes to associate. The owner's interest in choosing
his associates appears more worthy of protection than the like interest of the
person discriminated against even though it has no psychological overtones.
It is undesirable to hold that a person must associate with another merely
because the other so wishes. Courts have consistently denied specific per-
formance of personal service contracts for this reason.37 The owner still has
an interest in running the business in the way he sees fit even if he does not
come in contact with the customers. When the bundle of rights comprising
ownership is split among several persons, e.g., by a lease, the importance of
each one's interest depends on the relative importance of the rights he
possesses to the total possible rights. To the extent that he has made a sub-
stantial private investment in the property, the owner and not the govern-
ment should decide which people are to be served. There is always the
possibility that catering to Negroes will cause a loss of white customers. The
resulting drop in revenue could force a theretofore profitable concern out
of business. Since the owner would have to withstand this loss, he should
be allowed to choose freely whether or not he wishes to take the risk of
integrating.
The petitioner would have to show that the hardship to him resulting
36 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 438 (1954).
37 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Michael, 177 Md. 248, 9 A.2d 639 (1939).
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from discrimination overbalanced the interest of the restaurant owner before
the Supreme Court would reverse a state court's conviction for trespass. This
would appear to be difficult in the typical sit-in case, where the convicted
person probably had no reason for being on the premises except to demon-
strate. Thus, the impact of being denied service at the particular establish-
ment would not be too serious. Moreover, in the Deep South there is a strong
possibility that customers would take their trade elsewhere rather than
associate with Negroes, thus resulting in economic hardship on the owner.
Even when these hurdles are met in the extraordinary case, overcoming the
presumption of a state trespass statute's constitutionality would be very
difficult. The petitioner, to do so, would have to fill his brief with empirical
facts showing at least a need to eat at this particular place and minimizing
the possibility of loss of revenue if the restaurant desegregated.
